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Abstract 
For the first time, we test for effects of liability on hospital care using 
measures of current perceptions of litigation risk at hospital level; in particular, 
the risk-sharing arrangements agreed between hospitals and their insurers.   
GMM and ML estimators are used to allow for possible endogeneity of risk-
sharing arrangements. Our findings are consistent with the exercise of liability-
induced discretion by hospitals, especially regarding use of costly diagnostic 
imaging. Hospitals facing higher expected litigation costs also use these tests 
more frequently, after controlling for activity levels, casemix and treatment 
outcome; the latter indicating that defensive medicine may be present. We also 
find evidence of fewer new claims against these hospitals, given adverse 
events, which may indicate the increased use of claims management processes 
by hospital managers concerned at the expected cost of litigation. 
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Wollaton Rd, Nottingham NG8 1BB, UK. Email: paul.fenn@nottingham.ac.uk. We are 
grateful to seminar participants at Edinburgh University Management School and CMPO, 
Bristol, UK for comments on an earlier draft.  1 Introduction 
 
Health care providers in many countries can face significant costs arising from 
the need to compensate patients who have suffered from negligent care. The 
incentive to avoid these costs is arguably a means by which health care quality 
can be governed. At the same time, it is possible that providers will over-
supply care to minimise the risk of successful claims.  Were it to occur, such 
“defensive” behaviour would constitute a misallocation of scarce health 
resources.  Understandably, policy makers have been exercised by this issue, 
most recently in the US and the UK.
2
 
Empirical work by Kessler and McClellan (1996) notes that tort liability 
reform throughout the US in the ‘80s and ‘90s should have influenced 
treatment levels because of associated changes in physicians’ exposure to 
litigation risk.  Using data on heart treatments in 1984, 1987 and 1990, they 
estimate that reforms aimed at relaxing tort (e.g. damage caps, contingency fee 
caps, shifts to no-fault) decreased expenditure on heart treatments by between 
5% and 9% over the period, without any significant impact on health 
outcomes. From this they infer that the expenditure incurred was unnecessary 
from the health care perspective and was therefore evidence of so-called 
“defensive medicine”. Similarly, Dubay et al (1999, 2001) report evidence of 
“defensive” cesarian sections and prenatal care in response to malpractice 
fears, but of smaller magnitude, while results from an Office of Technology 
Assessment study, based on physician surveys about hypothetical clinical 
scenarios, found that approximately 8% of diagnostic testing was “consciously 
                                                 
2 For example: “When I first came to Washington, I wasn't sure if the proper role of the 
federal government was to get involved with medical liability reform. Then I saw what 
frivolous lawsuits and the defensive practice of medicine do to the federal budgets. They cost 
us a lot of money. And it's a national issue, therefore. And so Congress needs to pass medical 
liability reform -- not only to send a message that tort reform is vital, but also to help us 
control the cost of medicine…” (President Bush to Newspaper Association of America 
Annual Convention, April 21st, 2004).   In the UK, see the Chief Medical Officer’s recent 
report on reform options for medical malpractice (CMO, 2003). 
 2    defensive” (OTA, 1994). However, a Congressional Budget Office analysis 
failed to replicate Kessler and McClellan’s findings when extended to other 
patient groups (Beider and Hagen, 2004).
3 More recently, Kessler and 
McClellan have extended their research by exploring the mechanisms by 
which tort reforms affect the behaviour of health care providers, and find that 
the main effect is on the reduction of claim frequency and cost (Kessler and 
McClellan, 2000). It seems that US health care providers responded to 
changes in “malpractice pressure” primarily through using more diagnostic 




The premise underpinning this notion of defensive medicine is that more 
diagnostic procedures may help providers establish in court that sufficient care 
was taken in order to disprove claims of negligence, even where these 
procedures have no proven impact on treatment outcomes.
5 However, the 
incentive for providers to behave in this way could be diluted to the extent 
that they are covered by liability insurance, given that the insurer will bear 
(some of) the cost of each claim. This paper is concerned with the impact on 
defensive medicine of risk-sharing provisions imposed by liability insurers. 
The paper presents evidence on the effect of insurance deductibles (or 
“excesses”) on the extent to which individual hospitals successfully manage 
the risk of litigation, and whether this is associated with any discernable 
impact on treatment outcomes and/or the utilization of diagnostic 
procedures. 
                                                 
3 Similar ambiguity also appears in earlier work on defensive medicine: see Localio et al 
(1993), Klingman et al (1996), Baldwin et al (1995) and Sloan et al (1997). For broader 
overviews of the area see Danzon (2000a) and (2000b), Weiler (1991) and Weiler et al (1993). 
4 Moreover, it could be argued that US health care providers were better able to pursue this 
strategy because of the predominance of fee-for-service (“indemnity”) health insurance, and 
that the advent of managed care may remove some of the opportunities for undertaking 
diagnostic procedures which are not cost-justified from the perspective of the plan (Kessler 
and McClellan, 2002).  
5 This of course implies a failure of the courts to apply an appropriate test of the standard of 
care required – namely one which equated the marginal cost of care with its marginal benefit 
in terms of improved outcomes. 
 3     
The paper makes two contributions.  First, information on liability insurance 
excess levels provides a unique insight into the variying litigation risk to which 
individual providers are exposed.  Previously, a number of variables have been 
used to proxy the extent of this risk: Kessler and McClellan’s work uses  state-
level variations in tort regime; Localio et al. use area-wide variations in 
physician insurance premiums; Sloan et al. use previous claims experience.  
Each of these presents difficulties relating to the potential remoteness of the 
measure from current incentives for care.  We believe that we are able to 
measure a hospital’s perceived litigation risk more accurately than previous 
work because insurance deductibles (observed at hospital level) provide a 
direct link with the expected cost of litigation arising from a given claim.  In 
addition, while insurance coverage decisions, claims experience and tort 
reforms are all potentially endogenous (see Sloan et al, 1997; Cummins et al, 
2001), hospital level data are more likely to yield suitable instrumental 
variables as a means of addressing this problem convincingly, and our paper 
draws on this potential
6
 
Our second contribution is to note that defensive behaviour in the face of tort 
risk may encompass managerial decisions, such as those identified as 
“informal dispute resolution” techniques by Farber and White (1991).  In 
principle, the effects of insurance excesses on the hospital’s investment in 
both clinical and managerial decisions will depend on whether these inputs are 
complements or substitutes: for example, does additional informal dispute 
resolution effort increase or decrease the need for treatment care?  For the 
first time, we consider this empirically by examining the link between 
insurance excesses and claims experience (on the assumption that such 
managerial decisions are aimed at decreasing the likelihood of a claim arising 
for a given level of care). 
                                                 
6 Sloan et al (1997) test for endogeneity using instrumental variables, but these are drawn from 
county level data. 
 4       
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 gives some basic theory. Section 
3 reviews data available to us from UK hospitals, and the following section 
outlines the estimation methodology by which we test hypotheses concerning 
the effect of litigation risk on diagnostic procedures and treatment outcomes. 





Treatment failures (y) can be reduced if those involved take care (x) to avoid 
them. We assume that y=y(x), and yx<0, yxx>0.  However, to the extent that 
care is costly, health care providers may need to be given incentives to provide 
it.  One natural incentive against insufficient care levels is to make the 
provider causing the harm (assuming causation can be determined) liable for 
the costs involved, if that provider fails to supply care beyond a sufficient 
threshold (i.e. behaves ‘negligently’). In theory, for each treatment episode, the 
socially optimal level of care minimises total expected accident costs x + 
p(x)D, where D is the resulting damages, and p(x) is the probability of a 
treatment failure, assumed to be decreasing in x, but at a decreasing rate.  The 
socially optimal level of care solves 1 + p′(x*)D = 0: the marginal social 
benefit from an extra unit of care should equal its marginal social cost.
7   If 
courts are concerned with efficiency, they will set the legal standard of care at 
x*. If a patient suffers a treatment failure, and it can be shown that the 
provider delivered care below x*, it will be liable to pay D as compensation to 
the patient. 
 
When the level of care is observable to all, and a claim for damages is made if 
x<x*, it is straightforward to show that negligence liability would produce 
                                                 
7 See Miceli (1997) for more sophisticated models of liability rules.   
 5    socially optimal levels of care.  Under these assumptions a risk neutral 
provider’s care level solves  
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and the provider will clearly choose the efficient level of care x*.
8  Conditional 
on this choice, informed patients will make no claims for negligence, although 
some treatment failures will remain: y=y(x*). 
 
The informational assumptions required for this result are however 
substantial. On the one hand, patients may be uncertain about the provider’s 
level of care, and this may influence the likelihood of a claim for damages. On 
the other hand the courts may also be uncertain about the provider’s level of 
care, and this may influence the provider’s view about what is necessary to 
avoid liability. For both these reasons, it is likely that the level of care chosen 
by providers under negligence liability may not be optimal, and this in turn 
will influence the frequency of treatment failures and subsequent claims. 
 
Consider the possibility that both patients and courts observe the provider’s 
level of care with error (u and v respectively). That is, for a given x, patients 
observe x+u, where  [,] uu u ∈  is a random variable drawn from the density 
g(u), with E(u)=0. Similarly the court observes x+v, where  [,] vv v ∈  is a 
random variable drawn from the density h(v), with E(v)=0. Hence the ex ante 




  () () P r (| * ) P r ( | * ) xp xu x u x v x v x φ ≡ +< +<    (2) 
 
                                                 
8 This is guaranteed by the sharp increase in expected costs at care levels below x*. 
9 Assuming u and v are independently distributed. 
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∫  is the probability that the claim succeeds in court. It follows 





Minx x D φ +        (3) 
 
Shavell (1987) shows that the care level that solves this problem with one 
source of uncertainty is greater than x* provided that “the distribution of 
error is not too dispersed”.  It is possible to show that x > x* can still occur in 
the presence of our dual sources of uncertainty (see Appendix 1).  In medical 
terms, this over-investment in care due to legal uncertainty is known as 
“defensive medicine”. 
 
Apart from demonstrating the potential for defensive medicine, the discussion 
so far raises two additional points.  First, the above notion of defensiveness is 
of limited empirical value because it is difficult to operationalise: how does 
one judge when a level of care is greater than the (hard to measure) optimal 
level?  Kessler and McClellan’s (1996) solution is to identify as defensive that 
care which does not improve treatment outcomes.  In our setting, this means 
that x  is being applied despite the fact that y(x) has flattened out.  Second, an 
interesting corollary of the above result is that a provider faced with 
negligence liability has an incentive to control both the amount of care 
supplied (x) and the degree of error with which patients and courts observe 
the care level chosen (u and v). For a given level of care, improved information 
will result in fewer claims against the provider and a better chance of 
defending those that remain. It is for this reason that hospitals place 
considerable emphasis on accurate record-keeping and paper-trails, as well as 
 7    run a variety of complaints and mediation procedures in order to prevent 
treatment failures developing into legal claims (Farber and White, 1991). 
Activities of this nature are sometimes also discussed under the heading 
“defensive medicine”, but we prefer to reserve that term for the (over) use of 
diagnostic or treatment procedures in response to the threat of litigation.
10  In 
the context of our model, the provision of such information will alter the 
distribution of court and patient errors and, potentially, change the provider’s 
need to supply defensive levels of care.  As claims management procedures 
are, like care, costly to operate, we would expect providers to use a 
combination of these measures in order to reduce their litigation risk.
11
 
Another way in which health care providers can avoid this risk is by shifting it 
onto liability insurers, thereby possibly avoiding the incentives inherent in the 
negligence system – a moral hazard problem.  In this case a range of measures 
is available for insurers to mitigate moral hazard, including experience-rated 
premiums and deductibles.
12  To show the effect of deductibles on provider 
behaviour, it is necessary to introduce uncertainty over the damages incurred 
by the patient. We assume that  [,] DD D ∈  is a random variable drawn from 
the density f(D) (and cumulative distribution function F(D)) and denote claims 
management care as s. A provider who chooses a deductible of δ  
(DD δ ≤≤) is only liable for the first £δ of each claim, and therefore its care 
level decision solves 
 
                                                 
10 A better term for the use of procedures designed purely to reduce the incidence of 
successful claims contingent on treatment failure may be “claims management”. Of course, 
some of the activities identified by Farber and White (1991) may be designed to reduce claims 
by providing patients with alternative remedies rather than improved information, but we 
abstract from this complication here. 
11 Formally, calling claims management care s, the provider solves Minx,s x + s + φ(x, s)D.  An 
interior solution requires φx, φs < 0 so that claims management care reduces the probability of 
a successful claim by lowering the probability of claimant and court error.  Interactions 
between x and s will depend on the sign of φxs.  This may be positive or negative depending 
on how changes in x and s affect g(•) and h(•). 
12 The insurer may also seek to monitor its policyholders’ behaviour but the transactions costs of 
doing this may be prohibitive or damaging to the efficiency of the underlying liability rule. 
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While one might expect providers facing a larger share of their liability risk as 
a consequence of a large deductible to increase both treatment and claims 
management care, the effects of δ on x and s are generally ambiguous, 
depending on the sign of φxs.  In Appendix 2, a necessary condition for δ to 
increase both care levels is shown to be φxs < max{φxx, φss}: the care levels are 
complements or ‘moderate’ substitutes.  An intuitive (if extreme) example of a 
failure to meet this condition would be the case where claims management is 
so effective that claims rarely proceed, rendering treatment care relatively 
redundant.  In this case, the latter may not need to increase with the risk of 
litigation. 
 
To summarise our discussion, providers facing a litigation risk may take a 
number of steps to reduce this.  In the presence of patient and court error in 
the observation of care levels, these are likely to include the defensive over-
supply of treatment as well as investment in a variety of claims management 
processes (including detailed record keeping).  Such activities seek to reduce 
the impact of uncertainty on the likelihood of facing a claim and, conditional 
on such a claim, on the likelihood of losing the case.  We would typically 
(though not necessarily) expect providers who face a higher litigation risk (say, 
through a high deductible) to supply more care and to take more measures to 
reduce claims.  These predictions are, in themselves, of considerable interest 
as they make clear that providers can adopt a variety of costly responses to 
changes in their risk of litigation.  Accordingly, it is important to take all of 
these into account when assessing the effects of such changes in risk.  Further, 
 9    to the extent that any extra treatment care supplied does not affect treatment 
outcomes, there may be evidence of defensive medicine.  Below, we describe 





3.1 Excess  levels 
 
All hospitals in the UK face the same system of civil law, and the basis of 
liability has remained unchanged for centuries. However, it hospitals have not 
all faced the same expected cost of litigation. Since 1990, the health service in 
the UK has been decentralised to a significant degree such that individual 
hospitals have acquired considerable financial autonomy and have adopted 
commercial accounting practices. Over the same period, moreover, the 
responsibility for compensating injured patients has, almost unnoticed, shifted 
first from the individual clinician to the hospital
13, and now finally to the 
National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA) as the central agency 
set up to pool litigation risks through what is known as the Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST). The NHSLA has, from April 2002, 
taken financial responsibility for 100% of all claims against NHS hospitals. 
Prior to this date, under the terms of the CNST, hospitals had to retain part of 
the cost through choosing an “excess” level (i.e. a deductible), below which 
they were responsible for the patient’s claim.  Thus, each hospital until 
recently has chosen an excess level under the pooling scheme (the CNST), and 
this determines the subsequent exposure to liability risk. The payment for 
CNST cover varies depending on the hospital’s casemix, the excess level 
                                                 
13 So called “NHS indemnity” was introduced in 1990; in effect, the NHS accepted vicarious 
liability for negligent errors made by its employees and clinicians. In a broader context, it is 
this focussing of liability on the organization rather than the individual that has come to be 
known as “enterprise liability”. 
 10    chosen, and, to a limited degree, the risk management standards applied and 
the claims experience observed over previous years.
14 Hospitals with low 
excess levels faced a lower expected cost from litigation than those with high 
excess levels. Consequently we have a unique opportunity to test whether this 
variation in liability risk had an impact on claim frequency, treatment failures 
and the use of diagnostic tests. Table 1 shows the variation in CNST excess 
levels across all English hospitals in the scheme: 
 
Table 1 here 
 
One fundamental issue for the subsequent analysis of these data is the 
potential endogeneity of the chosen excess level. It is quite plausible that the 
perception of liability risk is an important consideration when hospital 
management decides upon the appropriate CNST excess level to choose, with 
a consequent risk of simultaneity bias in the estimates.
15 For this reason in 
what follows we have tested for and, where necessary, used appropriate 
estimators in order to allow for the endogeneity of this variable. 
 
3.2 Claims  experience 
 
Claims experience can be measured in a number of ways. For a sample of 
English hospitals in the CNST, we obtained data on the number of opened 
claims, the number of paid claims, and the number of claims currently 
outstanding (Fenn et al, 2001). Of these, the number of CNST claims newly 
opened is likely to be the best reflection of current care levels, given the long 
                                                 
14 Discounts of up to 25% of assessed contributions are given to hospitals who can 
demonstrate that they have in place certain risk management procedures. Contributions may 
also be varied by +/- 10% if there is evidence that their recent claims experience is 
substantially different from what was expected based on their casemix. 
15 Hospitals which feel they are at high risk of litigation, and who believe they can do little 
about this, may optimally choose low deductibles. Hospitals which believe they have taken 
effective action to control the risk of litigation may optimally choose high deductibles. For 
both these reasons, the measures we investigate below (claims, treatment failures, diagnostic 
tests) may be simultaneously determined with the excess level. 
 11    delay between claim initiation and claim payment for many medical 
malpractice claims. Figure 1 below shows the distribution of the number of 
new claims in 2001 for those hospitals that responded to our survey: 
 




The level of care taken by individual clinicians and health care providers is not 
generally observable. However, the Department of Health (DoH) does collect 
data from all hospitals on the numbers of certain types of diagnostic 
procedures – in particular the various types of imaging and scanning 
procedures which are available for diagnostic purposes.
16 These vary 
numerically from the very frequent and routine use of radio-graphs (“X-rays”) 
and obstetric ultrasound scans, to the less common but growing techniques 
such as MRI scans and fluoroscopy. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for 
these procedures. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
3.4 Treatment  failures 
 
Direct measures of the number of treatment failures arising from activity in 
each hospital are not available in the UK. However, as part of its emphasis on 
performance measurement at hospital level, the DoH routinely publishes data 
for each hospital on a range of outcome measures, such as 30-day mortality 
rates following specific types of admission. In addition they also publish the 
numbers of 28-day emergency readmissions following discharge. For our 
purpose this is a candidate proxy measure for the number of treatment failures 
                                                 
16 Department of Health Form KH12: “Imaging and radiodiagnostic examinations and tests”. 
 12    in each hospital. Figure 2 below shows the distribution of readmissions in 
2001 for all English hospital trusts. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
3.5 Exposure   
 
As far as factors potentially influencing inter-hospital variations in claims, 
treatment failures and diagnostic tests are concerned, the most important of 
these relate to the size and type of the hospital –  direct measures of exposure 
to litigation risk in the absence of liability insurance. Clearly, raw activity level 
measures such as the number of admissions or treatment episodes at a 
particular hospital will be a factor determining the number of procedures and 
treatment failures, and therefore the number of claims made by patients. In 
addition, the nature of the treatment episodes will presumably influence the 
frequency and cost of claims: maternity hospitals, and those with a large 
proportion of acute beds, may be more open to litigation than others, for 
instance. Table 3 summarises the data we have in relation to hospital size 
(measured by the number of “finished consultant episodes” or FCEs) and 
type. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
In what follows we use the broad casemix variables summarised here as one 
way of proxying the risk type of individual hospitals – that is, their exposure 
to litigation. However, these represent a very rough classification of risk, and 
an alternative possibility arises from the way the NHSLA calculates the CNST 
contributions for each hospital in the scheme. In practice, this involves each 
hospital submitting a breakdown of its whole-time equivalent staff by specialty 
area, and then allocating a weight to each of these specialty groups based on 
prior evidence on the litigation risk of each group. This gives the base 
 13    contribution, which prior to April 2002 was reduced in relation to the 
hospital’s chosen deductible/excess. This provides us with an alternative way 
of proxying risk type: we ran a regression of assessed contributions against a 
measure of hospital size and its excess, and used the residual from this 






4.1 New  claims 
 
For a given hospital, the process over time by which observed data are 
generated on the numbers of new claims could be characterised as a Poisson 
process with a constant rate of occurrence, µ. The observed number of claims 
would clearly depend on the population exposed to risk – such as the number 
of treatment episodes in a given year, N. Consequently, the expected number 
of new claims occurring in a given year at a given hospital would be the 
product Nπ, where π represents the mean probability of a treatment episode 
resulting in a claim. Given an assumed Poisson process, this would imply that 












=        ( 6 )  
 
While we can observe N for each hospital, the parameter π is a latent variable, 
which can nevertheless be modelled as a function of observed covariates and 
unobserved random variables. With a conventional loglinear specification of 
                                                 
17 The relevant OLS regression was: Contribution (£000) = 38.08[4.27] + 0.0055[33.78].FCEs 
- 0.0011[4.55].excess.  The R2 was 0.81 and the t-statistics are in square parentheses. 
 14    this function, we have 
 
12 exp( ) Nd π ββ =+ + 3 β 'ρ ε +       ( 7 )  
 
where  d measures the expected cost of subsequent litigation (i.e. the 
deductible) and ρ  is a vector of measures proxying the hospital’s risk type
18; 
β1, β2 and β3 are the associated coefficients. The error term ε measures the 
impact of unobserved heterogeneity in the underlying risk across hospitals. 
Incorporating (7) into (6) leads to overdispersion of the Poisson distribution. 
A mixed distribution can be obtained once an assumption is made about the 
distribution of exp(ε). A common assumption for the heterogeneity is the 
gamma distribution, and the resulting Poisson/gamma mixture can be shown 


















Γ+⎛⎞ ⎛ = ⎜ ⎜⎟ ΓΓ + + + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
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 (8) 
 
where α defines the one-parameter gamma distribution for the heterogeneity 
variable exp(ε). If the distributional assumptions explicit in the above are 
correct, estimation of the parameters α, β1, β2 and β3 by maximum likelihood 
is straightforward. 
 
As pointed out in section 3.1, we believe that d is a potentially endogenous 
regressor. To test for this in relation to new claims we use a method suggested 
by Wooldridge (1997) for count data models with endogenous explanatory 
variables along similar lines to those suggested in other limited dependent 
variable contexts by Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988).  
 
 
18 The exposure measure N is included as a regressor to capture the possibility that the per-
episode risk of an event is sensitive to the level of exposure (i.e. the size of the hospital). 
 15    For a given explanatory variable d which is potentially endogenous, it is 
possible to estimate a reduced form regression equation of the form 
 
d ν =+ z'θ          ( 9 )  
 
where z represents a vector of exogenous variables including at least one not 
included in ρ for identification purposes,   is the corresponding vector of 
reduced form coefficients and ν is the reduced form error term for the i’th 
hospital. If it is possible to obtain   as a consistent estimator for  , 
Wooldridge shows that the residuals 
θ
ˆ θ θ
ˆ ν  defined by  ˆ ˆ d ν =− z'θ  can be 
included as an additional covariate in a maximum likelihood estimator for the 
count data model, and that a significant coefficient on this covariate in the 
augmented regression is a robust test of the endogeneity of d. If the null of 
exogeneity cannot be rejected on the basis of a t-test on the relevant 




4.2  Diagnostic tests and readmissions 
 
While the data available to us on diagnostic tests and readmissions, as 
summarized in section 3 above, are also in principle generated by a count data 
process, the frequency of counts across hospitals in these cases is relatively 
high. Because the conditional means of these variables are correspondingly 
high, it is likely that the standard linear IV estimator in the face of endogeneity 
is available to us, and would be robust to alternative distributional forms. 
However, because the underlying count data process has an intrinsic 
heteroskedasticity, and because the standard linear IV estimator is inconsistent 
in the presence of endogeneity together with heteroskedasticity of uncertain 
origin, we prefer to begin with a more general estimator such as linear GMM, 
 16    which is fully robust and asymptotically efficient (Baum et al, 2003). 
 
We have grounds to believe that both issues may be relevant here. In 
particular, as discussed above, there is good reason to suspect that the 
deductible chosen by the hospital management is chosen with full knowledge 
of the litigation risks faced, and the actions planned to deal with these risks. 
Moreover, in addition to the intrinsic heteroskedasticity referred to above, the 
hospitals in our sample vary considerably in size and diversity, so arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity is likely. For these reasons we take the following approach 
to estimation: first, we estimate a GMM model for each event. Simultaneously, 
we test  for heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in order to determine whether 
GMM is indicated. If neither endogeneity nor heteroskedasticity is present, we 






5.1 Instrumental  variables 
 
To begin with, it is necessary to find ways of testing for the potential 
endogeneity of the deductible. To do this, some instruments are needed which 
fulfil the usual requirements of relevance and exogeneity. Fortunately, 
possibilities exist as a legacy of the initial regulations governing the choice of 
deductible. When the CNST was first brought into existence in 1995, 
restrictions were put in place on the minimum deductible permitted for 
different classes of hospital. For instance very large acute hospitals were 
initially not permitted to choose a deductible lower than £100,000
19, which in 
effect meant that they were exposed to the risk of paying for the great 
                                                 
19  £1 = $1.8 (May 2004) 
 17    majority of claims. However, as the scheme matured over the following six 
years, the rules were relaxed, and by 2001 most hospitals were permitted to 
choose deductibles as low as £10,000. Nevertheless, through natural inertia 
and administrative delay, some hospitals decided to leave their deductible 
where it stood, rather than enter into financial calculations as to the optimal 
deductible for their particular risk profile. For this reason, the deductibles in 
place in our year of analysis (2001) were correlated with the class of hospital 
for reasons which were independent of the hospital’s inherent risk type. To 
demonstrate the relevance of these instruments, Table 4 shows the results of a 
reduced form OLS regression explaining variations in the CNST excess level 
across NHS trusts in terms of the hospitals’ DoH classification, and their 
casemix (proxied in two different ways). This regression shows a strong 
influence of hospital class on the excess level, and the F-test of the joint 
significance of the four class indicator variables is high. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Having established the relevance of the candidate instruments, these are now 
used to test for the endogeneity of the deductible in regressions explaining the 
inter-hospital variation in litigation-related events: new claims, diagnostic tests, 
and treatment failures. 
 
 
5.2 New  claims 
 
We now consider whether providers respond to litigation risk by seeking to 
reduce the likelihood of facing claims (perhaps through the provision of 
information in an informal dispute resolution system, as described by Farber 
and White, 1991).  Table 5 presents the results of negative binomial ML 
regressions for the number of new claims as they vary across hospitals; again 
 18    two models are estimated corresponding to two different ways of proxying 
casemix.  
 
Table 5 here 
 
In columns (1) and (3) of the Table, the results are given for a regression 
augmented with the residuals from the relevant reduced form regression 
estimators. In both cases, the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected on the 
basis of a t-test. Consequently our preferred specifications are the non-
augmented models, as reported in columns (2) and (4). The exposure variable 
(FCEs) is highly significant and positive as expected, and the coefficients on 
the deductible are significantly negative in both models, implying that a high 
exposure to the expected cost of litigation is correlated with a lower frequency 
of new claims.  
 
 
5.3 Diagnostic  tests 
 
Next, we explore whether there is a link between exposure to litigation risk (as 
measured by the hospital’s deductible) and the supply of care.  Tables 6 and 7 
present GMM estimates for regressions on the numbers of diagnostic imaging 
procedures of various kinds (as described above). Model 1 (in Table 6) uses 
three casemix measures to proxy risk type; model 2 (in Table 7) uses the 
residual from a regression of CNST contributions on hospital size and its 
deductible as a proxy for risk type. The test statistics show, respectively, the F-
test for the overall fit of the regressions; the Pagan-Hall χ
2  test for 
heteroskedasticity; the Wu-Hausman F-test for the endogeneity of the 
deductible; and Hansen’s J-test of overidentifying restrictions (a test of 
instrument exogeneity). The null of exogeneity of the deductible is rejected 
strongly in five of the seven regressions in model 1 and six of the seven in 
 19    model 2. In all but one case where exogeneity is rejected, the J-test of 
overidentifying restrictions does not allow us to reject the null of instrument 
orthogonality, which confirms the instrument set as both relevant and 
exogenous. Moreover, the null of homoskedasticity is strongly rejected in four 
of the seven regressions in model 2, indicating that standard IV regressions 
would not be suitable for all these data.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 here 
 
The results seem to suggest a separation of diagnostic imaging tests into two 
groups. First, those which are routinely undertaken in large numbers, such as 
ultrasound scans (both obstetric and non-obstetric) and radiographs; second 
those which are undertaken far less frequently on a less routine basis, such as 
CT/MRI imaging, and fluoroscopy. The latter group consistently have 
positive and significant coefficients on the hospital’s deductible, implying that 
a greater exposure to potentially costly litigation encourages more of these 
tests to be undertaken (after taking account of the endogenous nature of the 
deductible in this context). With the former group, the coefficients on the 
deductible are much weaker, although generally positive. These tests are 
strongly determined by activity levels and casemix, and not apparently by fear 
of litigation.  
 
These results provide insight into hospital reactions to litigation risk.   They 
may also provide evidence of defensive medicine: hospitals appear to supply 
more discretionary types of care when their litigation risk is higher.  In order 
to consider this possibility further, we end by exploring Kessler and 
McClellan’s (1996) suggestion that genuinely defensive care will not impact 
upon treatment outcomes. 
 
 20    5.4 Treatment  failures 
 
Table 8 shows the results for GMM and OLS regressions on the number of 
emergency readmissions within 28 days of discharge. The statistics at the end 
of the GMM results show, as before, tests for overall fit, heteroskedasticity, 
endogeneity of the deductible, and instrument exogeneity. Both GMM models 
are significant overall, but it is not possible in either model to reject the null 
hypotheses that the deductible is exogenous and the disturbances are 
homoskedastic. In effect this means that GMM carries no advantages as an 
estimator, and OLS is preferred as a result of an improved small sample 
performance. Here the results are dominated by a strong impact of the 
exposure measure, and little else. In practice, the number of readmissions 
varies across hospitals only in relation to the number of patients admitted to 
treatment. There is not even a significant impact of hospital risk type (i.e. 
casemix). 
 
Table 8 here 
 
It appears from these results that the high incidence of diagnostic procedures 
in hospitals facing high litigation costs is not matched by a corresponding 
improvement in treatment outcomes, insofar as these can be measured by 
readmission rates. Whilst it is important to recognise that the lack of a 
correspondence between the use of diagnostic procedures and readmission 
rates does not rule out a relationship with other, longer term health outcomes, 
these results are consistent with the increased use of diagnostic procedures 
being “excessive”, and designed only to reduce the likelihood of successful 
litigation.  
 
 21    5.5 Elasticities 
 
Our findings can best be summarised by inspection of the following table of 
elasticities derived from the results reported in the previous sub-sections. The 
table shows the sensitivity of claims, various diagnostic procedures and 
readmissions to the relevant measures of activity and the insurance deductible 
respectively. The elasticities with respect to activity levels are indicators of the 
extent to which the adverse events considered here are simply driven by 
variations in the number of patients treated. The elasticities with respect to the 
deductible are indicators of the extent to which the events are driven by the 
expected cost of litigation, after controlling for hospital activity levels and 
casemix. 
 
Table 9 here 
 
As might be expected, both claims and readmissions are broadly proportional 
to the hospital’s activity level: that is, a 10% increase in a hospital’s treatment 
episodes results in an 11-12% increase in its emergency readmissions and 
negligence claims respectively. In the case of claims, there is some evidence 
that this would be supplemented by a 2% reduction in new claims conditional 
on a 10% increase in the deductible. By contrast there is no evidence of any 
significant impact of the deductible on the level of readmissions. 
 
As far as diagnostic imaging procedures are concerned, the relatively 
infrequent, non-routine procedures are highly sensitive to the deductible, and 
presumably, therefore, to the litigation threat. The most sensitive tests are 
MRI/CT scans, radio-isotopes and fluoroscopy. The results suggest, for 
example, that a hospital with a £100,000 CNST excess used in the region of 
50% more CT scans than hospitals with a £50,000 excess, after controlling for 
activity levels and casemix. By contrast the more routine procedures such as 
 22    ultrasound scans and radiographs are mainly driven by the underlying activity 





Under negligence liability, hospitals face the prospect of paying for harm 
caused to patients unless they can show that they (managers and clinicians) 
behaved reasonably in taking care to avoid the harm. Unfortunately, the 
courts’ interpretation of reasonable care is not always easy to predict, and the 
uncertainty over the standard of care required is one explanation for the 
claimed existence of so-called “defensive medicine” and for administrative 
expenditures devoted purely to the management of patient claims.  
 
The recent past has opened up a unique opportunity for research on this topic 
using UK NHS hospital data. A combination of financial autonomy at 
hospital level and risk-sharing arrangements in the years from 1995 to 2002 
means that data exist on the extent to which different hospitals faced differing 
expected litigation costs arising from their mistakes. Evidently, we would 
expect hospitals facing greater litigation risks to be more likely to take action 
to minimise these risks. Such hospitals could take more care, which would 
include both increased monitoring of clinical practice and increased use of 
diagnostic tests designed to ensure that appropriate decisions are made. 
Depending on the underlying technology, this increase in care may or may not 
have a significant impact on health outcomes at the margin. Hospitals faced 
with higher expected litigation costs may also engage in activities to minimise 
the number and success rate of claims consistent with a given level of care. 
 
The results reported in this paper are consistent with the exercise of litigation-
induced discretion in relation to the use of costly advances in certain types of 
 23    diagnostic imaging. Those hospitals which faced a higher expected cost of 
litigation were those which used these tests more frequently. The fact that 
these additional tests did not apparently translate into a lower readmission rate 
may suggest that they were being used “defensively”. That is, driven by 
uncertainty over the legal standard of care, providers have extended the use of 
such tests beyond the point at which they have significant benefits to 
patients.
20 Moreover, the finding that hospitals facing higher expected 
litigation costs reduced the number of new claims in spite of the absence of 
any impact on readmission rates may indicate the presence of a “Farber and 
White” effect, by which claims are “managed” through improved patient 
communication and informal dispute resolution measures. 
 
To conclude, this paper has shown rigorously using unique hospital-level data 
that the threat of litigation has an impact on both clinical and managerial 
discretion. Our results suggest that this impact may extend to the supply of 
defensive levels of treatment care, with associated wasteful expenditures. Of 
course, the policy implications of these results need careful thought.  For 
example, we believe it is unwise to ignore the possible incentive effects of 
liability rules on clinical practice and hospital management. The fact that we 
have identified hospitals responding to liability-induced incentives for 
increased care suggests that tort rules can be a powerful force for 
improvements in patient safety, even when they are filtered through liability 
insurance arrangements.  Such insights need to be borne in mind when 
evaluating alternative mechanisms for compensating medical injuries. 
 
 
                                                 
20 It is of course possible that diagnostic tests have an impact on securing the most suitable 
intervention for patients, with better long term outcomes, and that this does not show up in 
data on acute, short term emergency responses to treatment failures. 
 24    Appendix 1 
 
In this Appendix we confirm that defensive medicine may arise in the 
presence of two sources of uncertainty (in contrast to the single source in 
Shavell (1987).  As out purpose is only to demonstrate this possibility, we 
use an example. 
 
For simplicity, assume that g(u) and h(v) are identical uniform distributions 
on [a, b] and denote ∆ ≡ b – a.  (Shavell (1987) notes that the uniform 
distribution will support his result.)  Also, let p(x) = 1/x.  In the absence of 
any uncertainty, optimal care is x* = √D.  Given these assumptions, 
consider the problem in (2) in the text.  We shall show that the provider’s 
objective function can be decreasing in x when evaluated at x*: i.e. a higher 
value of x minimises the function.   
 
The derivative of the objective function in (2) is 
 
D x x h x x G x x H x x g p D x x H x x G x p )] * ( ) * ( ) * ( ) * ( [ )] * ( ) * ( )[ ( ' 1 − − + − − − − − +
 
Substituting for the distributions, and noting our simplifying assumption 
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As a < 0, there are combinations of a and D that will make this expression 





In this Appendix we provide a simple analysis of how the relationship 
between treatment care and claims management will influence the effect of 
insurance excesses.  
 
Denote treatment care by x and claims management effort by s.   The 
(composite) probability of a claim arising is now φ(x, s); we shall consider the 
signs of the partial (and cross-partial) derivatives of this below.  The hospital 
solves 
 
) | ( ) , (
,
δ φ D E s x s x Min
s x
+ +  
 
Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives, the first-order conditions are 
 
0 ) | ( 1 ) | ( 1 = + = + δ φ δ φ D E D E s x  
 
Note that a necessary condition for an interior solution to these equations is 
φx = φs = -1/E(D|δ) ≡ φ ′ < 0.   
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where E ≡ E(D|δ), Eδ > 0 and the first matrix is the Hessian (which we denote 
∆ below) and a sufficient second-order condition for a minimum requires |∆| 
































The sufficient second-order conditions for a minimum give φxx > 0 and φss > 
0, and the results reported in Section 2 follow directly from this. 
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Table 1: Excess levels for NHS hospitals, 2001 
 










Table 2: Diagnostic imaging procedures in NHS hospitals, 
2001 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
  
CT scans  156 7681 5873 9 48845 
MRI scans  140 3603 3098 1 20960 
Obst u/s scans  152 10453 5815 20 37273 
Other u/s scans  174 15909 11717 269 100045 
R-isotopes 132 3127 2495 1 16710 
R-graphs 176 89457 54837 597 363409 






Table 3: Treatment episodes and casemix variables, NHS 
hospitals 2001 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
    
Finished Consultant Episodes 304 39451 37857 3  207764 
Propn acute beds  357 .434 .377 0  1 
Propn general beds  357 .137 .178 0  1 
Propn maternity beds  357 .028 .047 0  .525 
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Table 4: Reduced form estimates for CNST excess levels, 
NHS hospitals 2001 
 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  CNST excess CNST excess 
 
Small/medium acute hospital  741 2,392 
 (0.22) (0.87) 
Large acute hospital  6,367 7,784 
 (2.04) (2.93) 
Very large acute hospital  19,464 20,555 
 (4.47) (5.59) 
Acute teaching hospital  50,530 52,137 
 (5.80) (6.07) 
Proportion maternity beds  29.341  
 (0.19)  
Proportion acute beds  42.231  
 (1.16)  
Proportion general beds  -3.326  
 (0.08)  
Contribution residual  -10.666 
 (0.49) 
 
Observations 356 303 
R-squared 0.34 0.34 
F stat (β1=β2=β3=β4=0)  13.59 16.71 
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Table 5: Negative binomial regression estimates and 
endogeneity tests for new claims, NHS hospitals 2001 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)
  New claims New claims New claims  New claims
FCEs 2001  0.000036 0.000033 0.000033  0.000031
 (7.12) (7.93) (4.75)  (5.43)
CNST excess  -0.000019 -0.000008 -0.000012  -0.000006
 (2.12) (2.50) (1.23)  (2.00)
Excess residual  0.000013 0.000007 
 (1.24) (0.58) 
Proportion maternity beds  0.020950 0.023870  
 (1.97) (1.81)  
Proportion acute beds  -0.000803 -0.001221  
 (0.12) (0.19)  
Proportion general beds  -0.020361 -0.018879  
 (1.75) (1.64)  
Contribution residual  0.000620  0.000707
 (0.61)  (0.71)
Observations 112 112 112  112
Wald test  107.95 109.37 42.13  39.54
Pr>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
alpha 0.71 0.72 0.78  0.78
 
  
Table 6: GMM estimates and tests for diagnostic imaging procedures (Model 1), NHS hospitals 2001 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (5) (4) (6) (7)









   
   
 
 
(2.49) (2.77) (0.26)  (1.68) (1.33) (0.12) (3.18)
FCEs 2001  0.043 0.009 0.108  0.233 0.019 1.467 0.049
(1.71) (0.50) (6.42)  (1.25) (7.45) (14.39) (2.72)
Proportion maternity beds 
 
-31.576 -154.175 563.666 176.949 -29.226 -620.329 -38.150
(0.22) (1.47) (6.56)  (0.38) (2.69) (2.80) (1.10)
Proportion acute beds 
 
46.969 30.414 0.582  7.469 2.632 132.982 28.250
(2.91) (2.39) (0.04)  (0.26) (0.36) (2.08) (2.31)
Proportion general beds 
 
24.306 20.296 3.623  71.740 -1.469 72.329 34.669
(0.84) (0.86) (0.15)  (0.07) (1.49) (0.65) (1.40)
Observations 153 137 149 171 129 173 162
F test  15.58 6.19 60.67  57.82 5.25 171.66 24.45
Pr>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wu-Hausman F test  14.93 30.93 0.50  11.25 33.22 0.51 53.50
Pr>F [H0: chosenxs is exogenous]  0.00 0.00 0.48  0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00
Pagan-Hall Chi2 test  47.20 18.62 39.76  49.85 23.79 46.10 22.06
Pr>Chi2 [H0: disturbance is 
homoskedastic] 
0.07 0.99 0.23 0.04 0.90 0.08 0.94
Hansen's J test  2.85 6.79 2.14  2.64 2.66 4.53 2.85
Pr>Chi2 [H0: instruments are 
orthogonal] 
0.42 0.08 0.54 0.45 0.45 0.21 0.42 35    
 
 
Table 7: GMM estimates and tests for diagnostic imaging procedures (Model 2), NHS hospitals 2001 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (5) (4) (6) (7)
    CT scans MRI
scans





CNST excess  0.090 0.064 -0.045  0.045 0.047 0.013 0.100
 
 




(2.66) (3.17) (1.21)  (1.77) (1.17) (0.07) (3.35)
FCEs 2001  0.060 0.018 0.145  0.254 0.021 1.502 0.059
(3.04) (1.22) (10.47)  (1.74) (12.82) (17.47) (4.00)
Contribution residual 
 
12.703 7.480 28.594  24.758 4.924 70.271 2.847
(3.06) (2.70) (6.55)  (1.59) (4.76) (3.00) (0.77)
Observations 153 137 149 171 129 173 162
F test  21.98 10.74 72.88  112.10 10.09
 
239.60 32.20
Pr>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wu-Hausman F test  11.40 21.95 7.00  5.56 27.88 0.00 50.69
Pr>F [H0: chosenxs is exogenous]  0.00 0.00 0.01  0.02 0.00 0.99 0.00
Pagan-Hall Chi2 test  34.51 22.35 66.26  57.57 19.79 63.66 21.75
Pr>Chi2 [H0: disturbance is 
homoskedastic] 
0.01 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.19
Hansen's J test  5.30 13.48 4.27  1.13 4.68 2.54 3.68
Pr>Chi2 [H0: instruments are 
orthogonal] 





Table 8: Regression estimates and associated diagnostic tests 
for readmissions, NHS hospitals 2001 
 
 (GMM) (OLS) (GMM)  (OLS)
 Readms Readms Readms  Readms
CNST excess  0.001315 -0.000475 0.001897  -0.000494
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.57)  (0.28)
Admissions 2001  0.063378 0.065228 0.062912  0.065383
 (24.96) (31.06) (25.02)  (32.35)
Proportion maternity beds  -22.907771 -20.354383  
 (1.34) (1.14)  
Proportion acute beds  2.708149 2.772787  
 (0.87) (0.88)  
Proportion general beds  4.069535 2.291333  
 (0.86) (0.57)  
Contribution residual  -0.400460  -0.299287
 (1.07)  (0.83)
Observations 154 154 154  154
F test  235.91 347.79 
Pr>F 0.00 0.00 
Wu-Hausman F test  1.30 2.33 
Pr>F [H0: chosenxs is exogenous]  0.26 0.13 
Pagan-Hall Chi2 test  38.29 32.58 
Pr>Chi2 [H0: disturbance is 
homoskedastic] 
0.12 0.00 
Hansen's J test  3.14 3.51 
Pr>Chi2 [H0: instruments are 
orthogonal] 
0.21 0.17 
R-squared 0.92   0.92
 Table 9: Elasticities of event numbers with respect to activity 
and excess levels, NHS hospitals 2001 
 
 
   Model 1  Model 2 
   Activity Excess Activity Excess 
New claims  1.235 -0.219 1.164 -0.170 
CT scans  0.350 0.529 0.508 0.472 
MRI scans  0.161 0.830 0.349 0.758 
Obst u/s scans  0.614 0.027 0.826 -0.153 
Other u/s scans  0.809 0.164 0.880 0.102 
R-isotopes 0.379 0.653 0.427 0.585 
R-graphs 0.877 0.009 0.899 0.005 
Fluoroscopy 0.476 0.678 0.576 0.621 
Readmissions 1.091 -0.006 1.093 -0.006 
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Figure 2: Frequency of emergency readmission within 28 
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